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cut acquisition costs, and reduce reliance on government
generated standards. The results of the research indicated
that HM&E procurement outcomes will not be essentially
affected by the new NDI policy. NDI has been an elemental
consideration in past HM&E procurements and a significant
factor in the current APL proliferation problem. The incor-
poration of more non-government standards to define equip-
ment requirements, though highly desirable to cut
development costs, is not always feasible. Current efforts
to convert government standards to non-government may be
overly optimistic due to the limited capabilities of the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. FOCUS OF THE STUDY
An Allowance Parts List (APL) is an identification
number and parts support data package that is assigned to
all equipment and components which are significantly
different than other equipment performing the same or
different functions, are mission essential, or require
onboard part support. Over the past ten years the
introduction of new APL's to the fleet has averaged 8,778
per year in Hull, Maintenance, and Electrical (HM&E)
equipment alone. [Ref. 1] This influx of new APL's
accounts for millions of dollars in additional
administrative costs each year. The annual increase in
APL's corresponds to an average increase in part support/new
National Stock Numbers of 28,559 [Ref. 1] per year. The
costs of procuring and replenishing the additional depth of
the repair/support parts or more importantly the additional
range of the new National Stock Numbers (NSN's) for these
new APL's has not been determined but is unquestionably
high. The numbers appear to indicate that standardization
of Navy HM&E equipment is out of control and that excessive
proliferation of parts, components, and equipments exist.
This thesis will discuss three factors that can
significantly contribute to a proliferation problem:
1. Congressional legislation calling for "preference for
nondevelopment items."
2. HM&E standardization efforts currently being studied
and implemented at the Navy Ships Parts Control Center
and the Naval Sea Logistic Center.
3. The efforts and abilities of voluntary non-government
standardization groups to implement Navy reguirements
within its specifications and develop standards for
HM&E recognized and utilized within industry.
In 1986 Congress included in its defense appropriations
bill a proviso that the defense department must consider
what is available in the commercial market— "off the shelf"
items
—
prior to contracting for any item or beginning the
research, development and testing phases that accompany the
development of purchase specifications for a new item
purchase. The official designation for these "off the
shelf" items is Non-developmental Items (NDI) . NDI ' s are
referred to as already developed and available hardware or
software that are capable of fulfilling technical
reguirements. Reliance on NDI will presumably minimize or
eliminate the need for costly, time consuming government-
sponsored research and development programs [Ref. 2] and
specification preparation investment.
The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Navy in
particular have been working to determine the effects of
implementing an NDI policy on the operational capabilities
within the fleet and the HM&E standardization programs. By
opening up procurement practices for HM&E eguipments and
accepting items that do not conform to military design and
performance standards and specifications, the Navy may be
exasperating the APL proliferation problem. Also, buying
NDI material in lieu of an item designed to military
specifications may lead to a stock of materials that will
not survive in a warship environment.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis investigates: 1) The effect of NDI
legislation on the efforts to curb APL proliferation in the
purchases of HM&E related items, and 2) Whether or not
voluntary non-government standards and boards are an
effective force with the ability to incorporate the Navy's
specific needs and requirements into industry standards.
The presentation of these questions will be only preliminary
because of the complexity of the matter. The relatedness of
the two objectives will be discussed later in the paper.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In order to accomplish the above objectives, the primary
research question addressed in this paper is: Can non-
government standards be developed sufficiently, rapidly, and
responsively and used to:
- effectively replace government standards and thereby
serve as a prerequisite for determining whether or not
an item is an acceptable NDI acquisition?
- curb APL and spare parts range proliferation in a more
effective manner than the standardization programs
currently being tested and developed?
In accomplishing the above the thesis will also answer
in part what items or data need to be considered in
determining whether an NDI item should be purchased by
performance specification as opposed to developing in-house
military/government specifications to guide the acquisition
process?
The subsidiary questions that are used to aid in
determining the answer to the above questions are:
1. What is the origin of NDI legislation, its expected
benefits, and anticipated problems?
2. How do the DOD and the Navy define NDI policy as
opposed to past procurement policy?
3. To what extent does APL and stock proliferation among
HM&E material result in added costs?
4. What effect will the NDI policy have on the problems
of APL proliferation?
5. Are effective standardization efforts currently being
implemented to address the APL proliferation problem?




What inputs do the non-government standards boards
use, how often do they meet, and who determines their
agenda?
8 Can the main determinant used to determine the
acceptability/adaptability of an NDI item be voluntary
non-government standards and board actions?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research was conducted by intensively reviewing
publications, reports, papers, instructions, memorandums,
and letters that were originated within the DOD and the
Navy. Outside literature was reviewed and numerous
interviews were conducted in person and over the telephone.
E. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study is limited to HM&E equipment/material managed
by the Navy's Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) . It is
necessary to restrict the study to a group of items that
have like characteristics in order to avoid excessively
broad generalizations. HM&E material is generally stable
and is typically not subject to sweeping changes in
technological development. Also, HM&E experiences the same
general Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) problems that
arise with ship installed equipment. If the equipment were
not intended for shipboard use other avenues of ILS support
could be pursued that would preclude a need for a supporting
spare parts inventory. A representative list of the 89
general types of equipment or commodity classes that
comprise the HM&E material is included in Chapter IV.
F. LIMITATIONS
This thesis examines NDI solely as it relates to HM&E.
The conclusions it draws are not necessarily transferable to
different types or classes of material. Different Inventory
Control Points (ICP's) have been established to manage the
requisitioning and provisioning of the variety of items
purchased by the DOD and the Navy.
Secondly, the study will investigate the effectiveness
of non-government standards groups based on a review of only
one group: the Shipbuilding Committee, designated F-25, of
the American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM) . Several
hundred standardization bodies exist. The ASTM committee
was selected as a representative of the population because a
strong relationship already exists between the Navy and the
F-2 5 committee. There is at least one representative from
the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEASYSCOM) serving as a
member for each of the F-25 subcommittees. The conclusions
drawn as to the effectiveness of voluntary standards bodies,
though drawn from an optimal but maybe less than representa-
tive source, can only be a preliminary assessment of the
entire spectrum of voluntary organizations' effectiveness in
fulfilling DOD requirements.
G. ASSUMPTIONS
It is assumed throughout this thesis that the reader is
familiar with basic Navy terminology especially as it
pertains to SPCC and the Naval Sea Logistics Center
(NAVSEALOGCEN) . Furthermore, it is assumed that the reader
is familiar with the basic policies involved in federal
government procurement procedures.
H. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I is
the introduction. Chapter II discusses research question 1,
the origin of NDI and DoD/Navy's policy effecting its
implementation, and the possible impact on APL
proliferation. Chapter III discusses the DoD/Navy
philosophy in interpreting and implementing NDI legislation.
Chapter IV examines APL and stock proliferation and the
effects NDI policy action could have on the problem.
Chapter V describes non-government voluntary standards
groups and evaluates their effectiveness to date in
reflecting the Navy's requirements. It will also discuss
the present and future feasibility of using their output as
a determinant to whether or not a product is an acceptable
NDI candidate. A summary of the results of the first five





In 19 8 6 the emphasis on acquisition sources and
procedures within the DOD was changed with enactment of the
fiscal year 1987 Defense Authorization Act by Congress.
Section 907 of this act amends Chapter 137 of title 10 of
the United States Code to include a "preference for
nondevelopmental items." Two reports precipitated the
congressional action. The President's Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management (The Packard Commission)
and the Defense Science Board Task Force 198 6 Summer Study





The country's political and economic policy as it
relates to NDI is not new. Over the past 25 years it has
been the government's philosophy to rely on the private
sector, where practical and feasible, to meet its needs.
[Ref. 3: p. 2] Adoption of non-government standards, which
is in effect an NDI policy, started in 1962 when 12
documents were brought into the DoD system. [Ref. 4: p. 1]
In 1972 the Commission on Government Procurement
reemphasized the need for a shift in fundamental philosophy
toward commercial product acquisition. [Ref. 2: p. 1-1] The
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rational for such was wholly economic. This approach would
allow the government to avoid the high costs associated with
product development, avoid specification development costs,
and save on ILS costs by utilizing established commercial
distribution channels to support the product. [Ref. 2:p. 1-
1] In 1974 the Office of Federal Procurement Policy was
founded. Their charter required that they foster a reliance
on the private sector. In 1976 The Office of Federal
Procurement Policy adopted all the Commission's
recommendations and issued a series of memorandums governing
the procurement of commercial products.
In 1982 the government recognized that a policy needed
to be reinstituted toward federal government reliance on
non-government standards. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) Circular A-119, Federal Participation in the
Development and Use of Voluntary Standards , established new
standards policy for Federal agency interaction with non-
government standards bodies and for government use of their
standards. A-119 advocates that voluntary private standards
and standards development activities are to be used,
promoted, and, adopted wherever possible in lieu of
government standards. [Ref. 5:p. 14] A-119 also directed
that:
- Government standards be reviewed every five years.
- An agency seek non-government standards which can be
substituted for any existing or new government standard.
- Only when existing voluntary standards are found to be
inadequate, unacceptable, or not forthcoming can the
government fall back on its own standards and standards
writing committees.
The practicality of such an absolute course of action
and the extent to which DoD/Navy has been able to live up to
the intent of this directive and the subsequent NDI
legislation is another topic that will be discussed later in
the thesis. By 1986, DoD had formally adopted over 3,500
non-government standards and were utilizing many more as
references in military specifications and standards. [Ref.
6: p. 21] Non-government standards comprised 7.68% of the
total of 46,728 specifications and standards within DoD,
15,756 of which were prepared for the Navy. [Ref. 6: Figure
4]
Furthermore, as early as 198 the Naval Sea Systems
Command had designated a focal point for non-government
standards bodies liaison, NAVSEA Code 55Z for all HM&E
equipment, whose job included initiating or directing NAVSEA
participation in developing non-government standards,
converting Navy documents to non-government standards, and
adopting satisfactory non-government standards for use by
DoD. [Ref. 7:p. 3]
C. THE PACKARD COMMISSION
In 1986, the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management concluded its study on defense management
practices and submitted its report re-emphasizing the
10
recommendations of earlier studies. The Packard Commission
report specifically recommended:
Rather than relying an excessively rigid military
specifications, the DoD should make greater use of
components, systems, and services available "off the
shelf." It should develop new or custom made items only
when it has been established that those readily available
items are clearly inadeguate to meet military
reguirements
.
The Packard Commission also noted that the Defense
System Acguisition Review Council had not been successful in
stimulating the use of NDI as an alternative to the
continued use of military specifications or the development
of unigue military products.
It is also important to note that both the Packard
Commission and the 1986 Defense Science Board in a follow-on
study titled, "The Use of Commercial Components in Military
Eguipment," determined that criteria other than product
price had to be considered before determining whether to buy
NDI, thereby supporting the tenets of OMB Circular A-109.
Life cycle costs should be used in a contract award decision
and items such as item supportability, maintainability,
interoperability, reliability, warranty, training, and
reprocurement must be considered. However in none of these
documents did it say how to assign costs to these items in
order to conduct a cost benefit analysis of one product or
procurement method over another.
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D. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1987
Based on the above recommendations Congress made it
public law in section 907 of the above act that:
The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that to the maximum
extent practicable
—
requirements of the DoD with respect to the
procurement of supplies are stated in terms of:
functions to be performed
performance required
essential physical characteristics
such requirements are defined so that nondevelopmen-
tal items may be procured to fulfill such require-
ments; and
- such requirements are fulfilled through the procure-
ment of nondevelopmental items. [Ref. 8]
The law also officially defined NDI as:




Any previously developed item of supply that is in use
by a department or agency of the United States, a
State or local government, or a foreign government
with which the united states has a mutual defense
cooperation agreement.
3 Any item of supply described above that requires only
minor modification in order to meet the requirements
of the procuring agency.
4 Any item of supply that is currently being produced
that does not meet the above requirements solely
because the item is: (1) not yet in use or, (2) not
yet available in the commercial marketplace.
The law also tasked DoD to enforce this legislation on
the services, as well as to identify and remove where
possible any statutes and legislation that may impede the
effectiveness of this initiative. DoD is to report on the
12
progress of implementing all the above requirements before
the first anniversary of the enactment of this act.
E. SUMMARY
The 1987 Defense Authorization Act changes the premises
upon which initial and provisioning procurements are to be
made. It was precipitated by the Packard Commission Report
and that Commission's perception that despite the emphasis
that has been reported in the background section of this
chapter regarding DoD's utilization of non-government
standards, little advance had been made in this area.
Whether or not there was an unseen bias in this report is
not the subject of this paper. In a literal interpretation,
the new law requires every purchase to be extensively
evaluated to first determine if an "off the shelf" item
exists or if a commercial item exists that requires only
moderate modification to meet the governments needs.
This is, if interpreted in the strictest manner, a short
run money saving endeavor that could possibly induce
occurrence of downstream life-cycle (ILS) costs that far
exceed the projected initial procurement cost savings. As
will be seen in later chapters an effective method of
assigning values to determine the cost-effectiveness of
using an NDI item in an HM&E environment is highly
complicated with ill defined boundaries as to which direct
and indirect costs should be quantified and used in




The Logistic Systems Analysis Office (LSAO) completed
and published a study in 1987 entitled Implications of
NonDevelopmental Item Systems Acquisitions for DoD Logistics
Support . The Office of the Specification Control Advocate
of the Navy has prepared an NDI handbook draft entitled
Department of the Navy Handbook of Non-Developmental Item
Acquisitions . DoD has drafted Directive 5000.37,
Acquisition and Logistic Support of Nondevelopmental Items
(NDI) . These three publications form the basis on which the
Navy will interpret and incorporate NDI as an alternative
acquisition tool. The first publication is a definitive
guide to the potential hazards and benefits of NDI compiled
from input from all the services. The second publication,
the Navy NDI Handbook, is primarily a "how to" guidebook.
The third publication was issued in order to implement the
Congressional Act and establish policies and responsibili-
ties for the acquisition of NDI within DoD.
This chapter is a summary of the contents of these three
publications. It is meant to give an insight into their
strong points while uncovering the points that need more
clarification. Many agencies interviewed for this report
including many individuals at SPCC and NAVSEA did not
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anticipate any implications of NDI beyond high technology
large ticket items. However, NDI policies apply to the
requirements for all end items, weapons, equipment,
components, or material for which commercial or other off-
the-shelf products are used or can be used. [Ref. 9: p. 2]
B . BACKGROUND
The concept of utilizing NDI for DoD purchases did not
magically come into being with the passage of the 1987
Defense Acquisition Act. The AT&T Dimension 2 000 telephone
system and the Zenith 12 and 248 Personal Computers are
examples of NDI that were in the fleet prior to the
authorization act. Confiquration control, provisioning
technical data, budgeting data and planned usage are and
were unknowns in these purchases. The support and success
of these systems has been limited and inconsistent. [Ref.
10] The Dimension 2000 phone system, which has been
installed on ships as recently as 1986 1 , is soon to go out
of production. This will possibly result in massive ILS
costs and early system obsolescence.
The Zenith 12 Microcomputer is another example of an
NDI purchase that was successful at providing needed
material to the fleet in a timely manner; yet a failure at
meeting sustainability and support requirements. [Ref. 10]
The Zenith 12 was procured to satisfy an immediate fleet
-'-The AT&T dimension 2000 phone system was installed on
the USS Charles F. Adams during its 1985-1986 overhaul.
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requirement for microcomputer capability while awaiting
deployment of a traditionally procured ADP system. Zenith
was awarded the initial contract in October 1983. The
intent was to support these systems fully with commercial
contractor services. This did not work. By 1985, the fleet
population of Zenith 120 *s was estimated to be 3000 units.
In October 1985 a contract for 20 Zenith 120 spare parts was
awarded by SPCC. As of September 2, 1986 there was no
Hardware System Command sponsor to determine additional
parts support requirements for the Zenith 12 0.
Other initiatives toward the NDI premise are ongoing and
successful programs. The "Buy Our Spares Smart" program is
an example of a program that as one of its objectives has
sought to identify alternative sources of supply, a form of
off-the-shelf items in lieu of higher priced stock numbered
items. Technicians and users in the fleet are encouraged to
identify items with NSN's that appear to be overpriced and
identify new less expensive sources of procurement. A three
year summary of pricing challenges, source savings, and
results are presented in the following table. The table
records the total number of challenges called in to the hot
line for the last three fiscal years, the number of
challenges that were recommendations for new cheaper sources
of supply, the number of alternate sources of supply that
were determined to be valid less expensive sources of
supply, and the projected procurement cost savings that
16
would result from the added lower priced competition.
Projected savings are calculated by taking estimated annual
usage and multiplying it by the difference between the old
NSN price and the new source price. The totals do not add
up because they include data from fiscal years prior to FY
1985.
FISCAL TOTAL SOURCE SOURCE PROJ.
YEAR CHALLENGES CHALLENGES ACCEPTANCES SAVINGS
1985 7520 656 60 $1.3M
1986 8463 1154 102 8.4M
1987 10006 1187 138 2.6M
TOTALS 33640 3744 384 $13. 6M
[Ref. 11•]
As of the date of acquisition of this data this is the
correct number of source acceptances and dollar savings for
fiscal year 1987. It is anticipated that both values will
increase as further research and determinations are made.
C . ADVANTAGES
The advantages that are derived from using NDI described
in this section are applicable dependent mainly upon the
extent to which an item is purely NDI. Prior to the
statutory definition of NDI and the DoD interpretation
listed above, each service had their own definition. The
Army, which has developed the greatest amount of policy
regarding NDI, classifies NDI into three categories. The
17
categories are distinguished by the type of additional
development an item requires and are:
Category A—Off-the-shelf items to be used in the
same environment for which the items were designed with
little or no further development required.
Category B—Off-the-shelf items to be used in an
environment different than that for which the items were
designed with some development required (ruggedization)
.
Category C—Integration of existing componentry and
the essential engineering effort to accomplish systems
integration with research and development to integrate
systems
.
It can be seen that as one moves away from "pure" NDI,
Category A, to items that incorporate military standards and
specifications the advantages discussed below will diminish.
The primary advantages of NDI acquisition are the time
and cost savings that can be generated. NDI allows the
military to:
- Reduce its reliance on its own rigidly developed speci-
cations and standards and provide a quick response to
operational needs by qualifying an item for use based on
proven commercial performance. (An item's conformance
to approved non-government standards is a possible basis
for evaluating commercial performance.)
- Reduce administrative and production lead times while
attaining a faster procurement schedule by virtually
eliminating new product research and development time
and buying a product that is already through or in
production.
- Purchase, in some instances, state of the art technology
with a reduction in technical, cost, and schedule risks.
D. DISADVANTAGES TO NDI
The disadvantages to NDI are more commonly referred to
as "challenges" in DoD literature. Many of the challenges
18
are directed at the concept of NDI in general but have more
to do with the increased emphasis that is being afforded it.
NDI will not result in the provisioning department at SPCC
operating any differently than it has in the past unless the
rules that determine an item's military acceptability are
drastically changed. [Ref. 12] Historically, contract bids
have allowed a contractor to match his inventory and
production capabilities against a government requirement.
Awards could then be made to the lowest bidder with a
modicum of assurance that the lowest bidder would meet a set
of minimum quality and performance standards.
The disadvantages that may develop are discussed in
detail in the LSAO report and are directly related to the
issues of timing, support concept, current forces interact-
ing with NDI, standardization, and configuration management.
This paper is most concerned with the topic of standardiza-
tion as it relates to equipment supportability, APL
proliferation, and ILS costs. In this respect pure NDI
purchases occurring in field contracting offices below the
Inventory Control Point or Hardware System Command's purview
has very negative effects.
Commercial items have an average life span of three to
five years on Military Sealift Command ships [Ref. 13]
compared to an expected design life span of ten to 2 years
for the military component counterpart. Military designed
systems normally have four major phases in their acquisition
19
cycle. Provisioning and technical data decisions and orders
are normally made during the production phase. An NDI
acquisition speeds up the process such that delivery can
occur before determinations are made regarding manning,
training, and test equipment requirements. Also, APL's and
spare parts support packages do not get developed and
technical manuals and drawings may not be available. The
average administrative lead time for SPCC to reprovision
items that are already in stock is 17 months. [Ref. 14] In
short, barring contractor support as in the case of the
Zenith 12 computer, NDI items can be delivered, break,
become unrepairable, or become obsolete before an APL is
developed or the first delivery of spare parts arrive
onboard a fleet unit. Also, leading to the accelerated
obsolescence of the NDI item is the problems that develop
because the accelerated purchase procedures allow no time
for development of Preventative Maintenance Schedules (PMS)
,
technician training, and distribution of technical manuals
and documents.
Relatedly, the Commander Naval Forces Pacific
(COMNAVSURFPAC) made the following observations regarding
non-SHIPALT electronic/weapon systems installations (NDI)
:
Rapid advances in electronics/computer technology and
support software have outstripped our ability to procure
them through the existing acquisition in a timely fashion.
Ship acquisition is pushing nine years and equipment/
system acquisition is approaching twelve years. At the
current rate of technology advancement, equipment/systems
procured "within the system" could be one to three years
behind state of the art.... NDI, Fleet Initiatives and
20
Rapid Prototype programs have all surfaced to help bridge
this time lag.
With the acguisition of desk top computers and off-
the-shelf hardware, we are buying into maintenance
strategies which minimize organizational involvement and
rely on redundancy. Prototyping is being used to outfit
entire battle groups rather than validating a concept on a
small scale. The requirements of the acguisition
logistician are time consuming, tedious, cumbersome, etc,
.
However unless NDI initiatives account for the "ilities"
(maintainability, supportability, reliability, etc.), any
gains in acquisition time will likely be negated by our
inability to maintain these items at sea, away from our
home bases. [Ref. 15]
E. IMPLICATIONS
Current directives in force regarding NDI do not
differentiate between the ILS support needs of a ship versus
a shore based squadron or command. The implications are
clear. An overall Navy policy toward NDI is not desirable.
In fact it could encourage policy that leads to further non-
standardization in the fleet and exasperate many of the
concerns previously mentioned. As will be discussed in the
next chapter more fully, any policy directed toward HM&E
that is not adjusted to carefully consider and weight the
effect on fleet standardization is not economical. The Navy
handbook on NDI, even though allowing for all kinds of
tradeoff analysis to take place before making a contract
award decision, does not do enough to task inventory
managers to develop cost effectiveness studies of their own.
For example, in the case of HM&E, an item manager must
decide certain major items:
21
- Is the item high value or throw away?
- Is the item essential to a ship performing any of its
primary missions?
- Is the item APL worthy?
If the item is not any of the above than an NDI decision is
not materially different from any past procurement decision.
However, if the item falls into one of the above categories
then a provisioning group must consider which of the four
types of support is required for the item. The four types
of support are:
1. Discard system and equipment upon failure (no
support)
.
2. Total contractor support.
3. Organic support.
4. A combination of organic and contractor support.
Type two and, to a lesser extent, type four support are
not practical for a mission essential shipboard piece of
equipment unless separate wartime and peacetime concepts of
support and repair are developed. While such innovative
concepts may appear very attractive to the shore-based
logistician and comptroller, they would not meet the
requirements of a fleet commander. Few individuals can
accurately predict the onslaught of hostilities.
The enormous number of variables, therefore, excludes
anyone from making a standard equation that could determine
whether an NDI purchase was better than a non-NDI even for
the limited area of HM&E. To aid the procurement process, a
22
revised policy on specification and standards control has
resulted in cognizant engineers updating all standards over
five years old and any standards or specifications that are
over six years old cannot be used in first time procurements
after 1 October, 1988. [Ref. 16] The review of all
specifications and standards at NAVSEA has been completed.
[Ref. 17] It can therefore be made incumbent on industry to
prove its products acceptability to these reviewed
standards. If voluntary non-government standards groups are
effective and responsive to DoD's requirements then the
avenue exists to streamline this decision process, which is
the topic of the last chapter of this thesis. However, if
non-government standards are unresponsive to the DoD
environment or non-existent then the decision to use or not
use NDI can be very difficult. Also, the lack of a set
determination method result in completely opposite
determinations dependent upon who is making the decision,
what they want the decision to be, and what variables and
weights are employed.
F. CONCLUSION
The positive aspects of the new NDI emphasis is that it
surely played a major role in the priority given to update
Navy procurement specifications and standards. It has made
it faster and easier to procure state of the art technology
when acceptable commercial items exist. It has also
resulted in organizations scrutinizing past NDI decisions
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and evaluating the results. The lessons learned from these
examples need to be correlated and distributed to Navy
procurers as well as industry buyers.
Some of the most "challenging" aspects of NDI will be to
recognize which life-cycle costs should be used to determine
the efficiency and cost effectiveness of an NDI acquisition
candidate. Recording the decision process must be carefully
done so as to preclude the possibility of a commercial firm
challenging a contract award decision, thereby further
lengthening the acquisition's lead time.
Inventory Managers must take the broad Navy guidance
written in the Navy's NDI Handbook and tailor it to the
different requirements inherent in the types of equipment
for which they are responsible. Large quantity system buys
below the Inventory Manager's level have been made by people
not aware of the implications. This has resulted in non-
support and early obsolescence. The authority for large
commands to make these decisions should be reviewed. A
special review should be given to the policies regarding
small one time NDI buys that are designed to meet
contingency requirements. These NDI purchases result in the
same non-support conditions that have been discussed at a
larger level and often are a result of a command placing
wartime priorities on peacetime requirements.
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G. SUMMARY
In order to best make the decision to NDI or not NDI one
must be familiar with all that is discussed above. Also one
must be familiar with the threat that an unbridled NDI
policy could have on the management and use of NDI
equipment. A poorly managed NDI policy would adversely
effect standardization efforts in the fleet due to both the
shorter projected NDI lifespan and the propensity for
commercial firms to change their design. [Ref. 3: p. 5] The
extent of that problem is the topic of the next chapter.
The other major question in the NDI procurement decision
process is how to determine product acceptability. The
revision of all standards and specification is a major step
in that direction but the different sizes, shapes, and
maintenance and training requirements can generate enormous
installation costs. Therefore if item requirements are
going to be "defined so that non developmental items may be
procured," shortcut methods must be used to determine a
commercial items acceptability. Chapter V discusses the
possibility of using and developing non-government voluntary
group's standards to accomplish this end while reducing
purchase price, ensuring item acceptability, and promoting
standardization and its benefits.
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IV. PROLIFERATION AND NON-STANDARDIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
NAVSEALOGCEN has created numerous standardization data
bases, files, and reports from which much of the data
presented in this chapter is extracted. Readily apparent
from just a cursory review of the historical data is the
proliferation rate of HM&E APL's. As stated in Chapter I,
there has been an average annual net increase over the past
ten years of 8,778 new APL's and 28,559 new NSN's. The
associated additional ILS costs for these increases is
estimated at $111. 5M per year. Further evidence of the
magnitude of the problem can be derived from the following
statistics:
- There are over 188,000 HM&E equipments with different
APL's installed on active duty ships.
- Over 73.36% are used on five or less ships.
- 34.61% or 65,403 APL's are unique to only one ship.
- Over 34,000 HM&E APL worthy equipments appear only once
in any application in the fleet. [Ref. 18 :p. V]
Some APL growth is highly desirable and acceptable. New
products and technology can lead to increased performance
and ship capability. Unfortunately, much of the above
growth appears to be linked to manufacturers or model
differences that result from using performance
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standards/specifications vice design or build to
specifications.
Non-standardization results in increased inventory range
requirements and life cycle/ownership costs. It would also
appear to be a function of the contracting officer ignoring
Ownership Costs by placing all emphasis as to whether or not
to award a contract on the basis of which bidder submits the
proposal with the lowest acquisition price. There are
detailed regulations written for the procedures that must be
followed when a project manager is coordinating the
acquisition plan for a new major weapon system regarding the
computation of ownership costs. The reprovisioning of HM&E
equipment, components, and parts at SPCC is triggered by
relatively complex computer generated inventory and EOQ
models. It can be assumed that because the EOQ model is
designed to minimize costs the reordering for any one item
is held to a minimum. The dollar amounts associated with
many of the contracts are relatively small in size. Until
recently ownership costs were deemed insignificant compared
to the benefits perceived from increasing competition and
the industrial base.
Without the standardization data bases compiled only in
the last few years by NAVSEALOGCEN, it was hard to
understand how anyone could even assess the true magnitude
of the proliferation problem and the resulting increase in
ownership costs that accompanied it. Utilizing the
27
information that has been stated in previous chapters, it
can be inferred based on both intuitive and factual data
that increased NDI procurement activity increases the level
of equipment non-standardization. NDI is the purchase of
off the shelf equipment including those items that may
require minor modification to meet military standards.
Essentially that definition covers a major percentage of all
the reprovisioning equipment purchased by SPCC. Valves,
pumps, engines, and motors are universally available in all
different sizes and shapes. Whether or not non-government
standards exist or can be developed to create standards
within the industry for any of these items is a topic of a
later chapter. But let us assume that the Navy's usage
while substantial is in most cases an insignificant portion
of the market share. Clarke's study on diesel engines [Ref.
19] and Tryon's thesis on integrated circuits [Ref. 20]
support this assumption.
NDI would appear to be little more than a term defining
current purchasing procedures at SPCC. The major effects of
the legislation will be in how it is interpreted by
contracting agents outside of SPCC when they are procuring
equipment that will later be supported by SPCC. The lessons
to be learned can be drawn from the thousands of
NDI/reprovisioning decisions that have resulted in the
growth of non-standardization in HM&E.
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In order to determine the effects of NDI as it relates
to the increased non-standardization of HM&E to date, this
chapter will discuss:
- The criteria used in deciding whether to assign a new
APL and the costs that decision carries with it.
- The magnitude of the APL proliferation problem.
- The costs of competition for NDI HM&E and the associated
equipment parts and range build up.
- The potential causes and sources of the new APL's.
- Two standardization programs designed to limit APL
proliferation.
B. APL WORTHINESS
References have been made regarding APL's throughout
this thesis. Thus far little definition has been given as
to what constitutes the need for an APL number and what
criteria shall be used in making the decision as to whether
or not an APL should be assigned to a new piece of
equipment. For the equipments that SPCC is the program
support ICP, APL's are concurrently assigned with and based
upon the Allowance Support Code (ASC) that is assigned to
the equipment. [Ref. 21 :p. 1] ASC is the collective title
given to three separate but related codes that record
information concerning an equipment or component. The three
codes the ASC is comprised of are:
- The Technical Cognizance Code, assigned by SPCC when a
new equipment is identified or procured, identifies the
Hardware Systems Command having technical control over
the equipment or component.
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- The Application/Identification Number Activity Code,
assigned by SPCC, records the ICP responsible for
program support for the eguipment and the type of
configuration number assigned.
- The Logistic Support Status Code records the decision of
the Hardware Systems Command as to the degree of support
reguired and the extent or type of support currently
available for the eguipment or component, or the reason
an eguipment may not be supported by allowances or
through the supply system. [Ref. 21: p. 3]
Therefore SPCC assigns an APL to:
- Equipments and components for which full or partial
supply support is provided.
- Eguipments or components for which no specific supply
support is provided when record of the eguipment or
component application is reguired for configuration
accounting purposes.
In short eguipments that are deemed mission essential
and that require repair part support or eguipments that are
significantly different from other functionally equal
eguipments so as to require increased or different personal
training, maintenance eguipment or maintenance procedures
are issued their own APL's. An ILS determination normally
to happens before end product procurement and delivery so
that a timely provisioning process can take place. That is
not always the case. Requisitions for emergency or system
requirements contracted at other than the ICP level are
recorded through a maintenance reporting system that is slow
to interface with the provisioning process. Additional
guidelines including over 2 pages of special instructions
pertinent to APL preparation or non-preparation are included
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as enclosure (2) to attachment (1) of NAVSEA Instruction
4441.4.
C. APL COSTS
The mere addition of a new APL is a costly endeavor.
Each new APL requires certain administrative costs in order
to generate the document and maintain it. The real costs of
a new APL while available and quantified in the NAVSEALOGCEN
Standardization Benefits Analysis Report by commodity class
is best computed individually. The hidden costs associated
with introducing a new piece of equipment/APL to the fleet
is better described by an evaluation similar to the 'summary
of costs associated with competitive procurements' [Ref.
22]. The cost of competition or of an award made to a
company that would provide a product significantly different
from what is currently in the inventory system so as to
warrant its own APL is the same as the ownership costs that
can be attributed to an NDI purchase. It is represented by
the following equation:
C = Cptd + Cp +Cm + Ct + Ctm + Cd + Ccc + Cqt + Cpm
where
:
C = Cost of Competition
Cptd = Cost of Provisioning Technical Documentation
Cm = Cost of Provisioning
Cm = Cost of Maintenance
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Ct = Cost of Training
Ctm = Cost of Technical Manuals
Cd = Cost of Installation Drawing Changes
Ccc = Cost of Configuration Control
Cqt = Cost of Testing
Cpm = Cost of Planned Maintenance.
For HM&E equipment this evaluation can be converted to
incorporate the number of parts stocked for the equipment
being replaced (P) , the expected life cycle of the new
equipment (L) , the price of the original equipment (PR) , the
number of classes of ships receiving the equipment (CL) , and
the total number of equipments to be installed (POP) . The
resulting equation that is used by NAVSEALOGCEN is a useful
tool in estimating the costs that the government will incur
by awarding a contract that will result in an alternate
design/APL support package. The cost value is as previously
stated the ownership cost and is separate and apart from a
contract award price. While some of the values can be equal
to zero it is not probable that the cost of competition
equals zero.
Despite the additional costs of adding new APL's to the
Fleet, there has been a relatively constant increase of
about 9,000 a year. A competition advocate would argue that
the added benefits of competitive bidding such as increasing
the industrial base, increased technological development,
and an ultimately a less expensive end product because more
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than one company is capable of producing the product are
worth more than the additional costs implied by the cost of
competition equation. While that may be true in some
instances, it has not been an apparent factor in contract
award determinations to date.
While performing the research for this thesis, no
evidence has been discovered to indicate that any
procurement or acquisition instruction exists that defines
what costs and benefits should be considered prior to
contract award, how values should be arrived at and
assigned, nor what criteria should be used to determine when
the cost of proliferation exceeds the benefits of
standardization. The intent that such procedures should be
heavily weighted prior to any award is omnipresent.
While this equation serves to place a nominal value on
the cost of adding an additional APL the values are purely
subjective. Each one of the variables assigned to the
equation is composed of multiple sub-variables that require
subjective value judgments to be made. For example, the
cost of training can be effected by the length of training
required, training site costs, etc. The number of factors
is arbitrary and can easily be offset by an imaginative
interpretation of the anticipated benefits. While the use
of this equation is not a requirement of any SPCC or NAVSEA
instruction, it is an integral part of a standardization
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program that is being readied for implementation and will be
discussed later in the chapter.
D. PROLIFERATION/NON-STANDARDIZATION
The proliferation of HM&E APL's does not always
correlate favorably with increased capabilities but instead
can result in one function being performed by many different
pieces of equipment.
A functionally interchangeable, but different design
valve was recently procured by the USS Miller (FF-1091) from
the supply system. The replacement valve weighed 4 00 pounds
more than the original valve that it was replacing and
required significant piping configuration changes at
considerable cost in order to effect installation.
Similarly the number of functionally similar equipments that
are significantly different enough to require separate
APL's.
Research was recently completed that determined that the
Navy supported more than twenty different small boat engine
equipment APL's representing a ship population of 4 30 and a
fleet population of 878 which were functionally
interchangeable based on six critical form, fit, and
function characteristics. [Ref. 19: p. 37] In this instance
all 2 APL engines were produced by the same company,
Detroit Diesel. Acquisition specifications did not change;
only the technology employed in the engine. Despite a high
degree of repair part interchangeability, the administrative
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costs of building and maintaining new APL's and necessary
maintenance data are real. Clark concluded in his
publication that the Navy has allowed commercial market
forces to solve its ownership cost minimization problem.
However, Clark's choice of an equipment to analyze would not
seem to yield results indicative of all similar equipment
groups that could have been used. Clark was unable to
determine why Detroit Diesel was the only manufacturer of
this type Navy diesel. A more likely scenario would have a
like group of equipment being competitively procured
periodically from different manufacturers resulting in
different maintenance and spare parts requirements. [Ref.
23:pp. 34-41]
There is little more than intuitive data available to
determine an exact breakdown of the seriousness and extent
of APL proliferation. NAVSEALOGCEN has compiled a
Standardization Benefits Analysis Report summarized below.
The report is broken down by commodity class number (CC) , CC
name, the total number of unique APL' s/equipment within each
CC, the total of all equipments within the commodity class
installed in the fleet, and the average yearly growth of
APL's experienced within that CC over the past ten years.
The data is current through 1986.
A review of the data below does not reveal anything in
and of itself. The data in the list below are is a repre-
sentative sample of the 89 CC's chosen at random. It serves
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STANDARDIZATION BENEFITS ANALYSIS
cc CC Name Total APL's Total Pop. GROWTH/YEAR
01 PUMPS 7,400 118, 070 364
02 BOILERS 198 1, 525 8
13 TRANSFORMERS 878 102, 412 9
15 CONTROLLERS 11,812 159, 326 459
17 MOTORS 14,014 177, 056 740
24 LIGHTING FIX. 1,035 1 ,404, 922 24
26 PROJECTION EQUIP. 54 3, 753 1
28 NAVIGATION EQUIP. 322 9, 447 15
32 REFRIG. EQUIP. 3,407 62, 866 255
33 AIR CONDITIONING 206 4, r 747 26
34 STARTERS 216 4,,512 14
38 INDICATORS 2,192 98, 042 127
43 GALLEY EQUIP. 2,142 30,,416 146
50 PANELS 4,265 81 ,303 224
53 CAPSTANS 140 1 ,059 4
55 REELS 306 8 ,290 17
56 DAVITS 191 1 ,001 4
59 ELEVATORS 740 4 ,759 12
88 VALVES 59,254 4
,
118 ,680 1,968
to demonstrate how the entire data base can be misleading.
For example, a cursory review would lead one to conclude
that a far greater proliferation problem exists in the valve
CC than in the galley equipment CC. This assumption can
not be made on the above data alone. There may be far more
functional differentiations for valve types than for galley
equipment. It may be that a total of 2,142 APL's growing at
an annual rate of 7% to accomplish a finite number of
cooking and cleaning functions is a more serious
proliferation problem than the 1,968 or 3% annual growth
being experienced with the valve CC. Valves may have far
more applications, functions, and uses than galley equipment
and the annual APL growth of 1,968 may be the result of an
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outstanding effort to standardize and eliminate
proliferation in this area. It is beyond the scope of this
report to resolve such an argument. The data is presented
strictly to demonstrate that a proliferation problem would
appear to exist.
Many of the CC ' s include items that perform similar
functions but are significantly different in design, size,
and shape to warrant a separate APL.
E. PROLIFERATION CAUSES
Corbett and Clarke in their theses, referenced
throughout this chapter, attempt to pindown the contributing
causes and the exact percentage of the problem each cause
constitutes. Corbett attempted to form a regression
equation that could explain the rate of proliferation in
terms of the source of APL's. Corbett used the 44 commodity
classes that showed an average annual growth that exceeded
the aggregate average of the entire 89 commodity classes in
at least four of the last five years starting in 1982. He
then performed a regression analysis based on new ship
deliveries. The regression equation was valid for only 14
of the 44 CC's analyzed. Though Corbett' s regression
equation was flawed, he developed a negative coefficient to
describe a positive correlation [Ref. 23:p. 44], his work
did support the idea that reasons for APL growth differed
among and within commodity classes. Corbett was then able
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to make the conclusion that APL growth could be attributed
to the following factors:
- New ship deliveries.
- Shipyard introduction of new equipment through regular
overhauls and ship restricted availabilities.
- Duplication; or like items being assigned separate APL's
due to insufficient data or error.
- Competition.
- Field contracting officers procuring items outside the
normal supply system.
This last cause is especially significant for as Corbett
points out "it takes as little as thirty minutes to write a
justification for using a piece part not in the DoD supply
catalog." The Naval Audit Service finding cited by Corbett
went on to say:
...our review indicated that selections were based
primarily on engineering knowledge of specific commercial
products that met the alteration or repair requirements ,
without considering the adaptability of existing standard
equipment.
The Naval Audit Service has made the assumption that non-
government standards exist and are acceptable for HM&E
equipment. If these standards exist then they have
described the perfect NDI item: an item acceptable for
military use that is widespread available and built to
industry accepted non-government standards that will assure
parts support well into the future, non-obsolescence, and a
relative security from product changes being incorporated in
order to obtain a marketing edge. It is questionable as to
whether or not "existing standards" even exist.
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Other common sense reasons for proliferation also
contribute to the problem of non-standardization. Such as:
- Technological improvements.
- Incorporating new contract standards or specifications
based on lessons learned regarding safety or
performance.
- Business closings of suppliers causing a unique design
to become obsolete.
Even the FFG-7 and DD-963 class ships, the newest class
ships for which historical data exist, have very disturbing
standardization profiles. The FFG-7 class has:
- 3 67 unique APL's.
- 387 APL's are installed aboard only one ship in the
fleet.
- 555 APL's are installed aboard only one ship in the
class.
- Over 40% of unique APL's are installed on half or less
than half of the ships in the class.
Similarly, the DD-963 class has:
- 6809 unique APL's.
- 625 APL's are installed aboard only one ship in the
fleet.
- 2365 or 34.73% of the APL's are installed aboard only
one ship in the class.
- Over 55% of unique APL's are installed on half or less
than half of the ships in the class.
Many activities contribute to the non-standardization
figures. As Corbett and Clarke found, each activity in the
contracting chain, from the organizational unit to the
Inventory Manager at the ICP, is operating under a different
set values, schedules, priorities and deadlines. The data
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bases available today are not universally compatible enough
to easily extract the source of new APL's. Generalizations
have been developed and accepted when required. [Ref. 23 :p.
42]
The problem of pinpointing the source of APL non-
standardization is even more pronounced within the FFG-7
class ship, all of which have been in commission 12 years or
less. The sources and real degree of design difference is
unknown. It is also, currently, a statistic that could not
be economically derived. [Ref. 12] Each ship is required
to submit a form called a 4790CK when a new piece of
equipment is installed or removed from it in order to
upgrade its weapons system file at SPCC. The form has no
requirement for the ship to list the source or reason for
the change. Inferences could be made based on the ship's
schedule at the time that the reported configuration change
was submitted or possibly inferred from the write up on the
form. Often the forms are illegible, incomprehensible, or
submitted with no apparent relation to the date the actual
equipment was installed or removed from the ship.
F. STANDARDIZATION PROGRAMS
There are many standardization programs and initiatives
that are currently being implemented or designed throughout
the Navy, including NAVSEA and SPCC. It appears that none
of the programs may be widely enough applied and enforced to
make a substantial difference in the amount of APL
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proliferation and equipment non-standardization. This
section addresses two programs that are being concurrently
worked on by both NAVSEALOGCEN and SPCC.
In the section of this chapter on APL Costs, the cost of
competition equation was presented. It represented the
additional costs that SPCC incurred each time an additional
piece of equipment was purchased that performed a function
essentially the same as one already being performed by a
Navy owned APL worthy piece of equipment. The equation is
the basis of a standardization initiative called the Request
For Proposal package. It is, as of January 1988, being
developed into a contract clause that will be legally and
competitively acceptable for inclusion in solicitations.
The program invokes the basic premises of OMB circular
A-109 and requires a contractor to add ownership costs into
his bid whenever an item is being competed for which APL's
currently exist. The intended results of such a program is
to reduce government costs, promote standardization, and
maintain competition.
A second major initiative being promoted and
incorporated by the Navy Supply Systems Command,
NAVSEASYSCOM, NAVSEALOGCEN, and SPCC is the Standardization
Candidate Selection Criteria (SCSC) Program. 2 The SCSC
first identifies potential standardization candidates
2 A detailed description of the SCSC model is available in
Mr. Richard Jones, NAVSEALOGCEN, Mechanicsburg , PA,
Standardization Candidate Selection Criteria , undated.
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utilizing the Standardization Benefits Analysis. For
example, a report can be generated to list the APL's for all
pumps that have the same characteristics; i.e.: pressure
and capacity. If a significant number of APL groups with
high numbers of APL's, low APL to manufacturer ratio, and a
high influx level to the fleet in the recent past are found
to exist then further investigation is done to determine
whether or not the equipment is interchangeable or has the
capacity to be combined under a like design. If a group of
APL's meets this criteria, an economic analysis is performed
to determine the potential savings, a design selection
process is conducted to determine the optimum method for
design standardization, and the results of the computations
and determinations for all the APL groups are ranked based
on the anticipated return on investment.
The net results of this plan is to reduce ownership
costs by standardizing designs in the fleet. The premise is
that the number of APL's will be reduced through the use of
a standard design whose cost is offset over a five year
amortization of acquisition and support costs. The
standardization paybacks of this program with only 3 design
projects initiated and 4 completed are:
- A total reduction of APL's of 638 (7% of the average
annual APL increase)
.
- $73. 4M in direct cost savings (original and projected
acquisition savings)
- Projected ILS savings over a seven year cycle of $4.5M.
[Ref. 1]
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The four programs completed are for the 2 inch and
under valve, the titanium fire pump, the P-250 portable fire
pump, and shipboard air conditioners.
In the case of both these initiatives the projected
impact on standardization may be greatly overstated. While
each plan in theory will theoretically serve to reduce the
number of APL's in the fleet, insufficient data exists to
make a bold statement of savings regarding ILS savings.
Without a firm understanding of the origin of new APL's as
discussed previously and strict controls over future
purchases by the other factors of proliferation ILS
predictions are meaningless. The range of APL's currently
in the fleet for any given equipment type will still require
support throughout their active life. New APL's will
continue to be installed in overhauls and urgent repair
situations as past history seems to indicate. The
proliferation is halted at SPCC through the use of standard
designs and build to specification contracts and
considerably slowed through the use of the Request for
Proposal standardization program. Neither program will be
successful as advertised until the other factors of
proliferation are brought under control.
G. SUMMARY
Ownership costs and data design rights are vehicles for
bringing APL proliferation under control. To date the
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results of the effort extended in the above area would
appear to be insignificant. In fact there is no evidence
offered to indicate that growth has slowed at all or that
the Navy can realistically hope to realize the results that
it is predicting. It is an evidenced conclusion that HM&E
equipment is NDI in nature and that past procurement of HM&E
is tantamount to NDI procurement. It is contributing to a
burgeoning rate of non-standardization and APL and parts
proliferation. It would therefore appear that industry
standards are inadequate to allow for standardization and a




One of the premises of the original NDI legislation is
that the government/DoD relied too heavily on government
specifications when non-government standards and
specifications might exist to provide the same product or
service at a greatly reduced acquisition price. HM&E
procurements have been predominantly modified or ruggedized
NDI and have resulted in an expensive proliferation problem.
This chapter will examine:
- The two basic types of standards.
- The causes of and reasons for non-government standards.
- The general procedures involved with creating a non-
government/ASTM standard.
- The degree and effectiveness of the Navy's interaction
with non-government standards organizations.
- The feasibility of adopting and creating non-government
standards in lieu of renewing or creating government
designs and standards.
This last question is particularly germane in light of a
memo recently circulated throughout NAVSEA from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense. The memo accompanies a
proposed instruction that will institute a policy requiring
DoD approval for any renewals of existing standards or the
development of any new military specifications within 325
Federal Classes of materials. The Assistant Secretary
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asserts that commercial specifications and standards exist
in these classes and that the military has not fairly
evaluated their suitability for use in government
procurement. [Ref. 24] In order for the Navy to truly
assess the validity and need of such a requirement, many of
the questions that are discussed in this preliminary and
necessarily cursory study of the ASTM F-2 5 Committee on
Shipbuilding need to be addressed.
The results of this study appear to establish that the
work currently beinq done by this committee will reduce HM&E
proliferation, will not qreatly reduce procurement costs,
and will not enhance the military's ability to economically
evaluate and procure in commercial markets. Industry
participation on the boards appears to be limited. Their
ability to qenerate standards is a tedious process that in
the case of a complex standard may never come to fruition.
B. COMMERCIAL STANDARDIZATION
There are two qeneral types of standardization. One
type deals with standards of quality or performance and the
other deals with standards for uniformity or desiqn. There
are many commercial examples of each. Screw threads,
railroad track qauqe, record sizes, and record speeds are
examples of uniformity standards. These standards have been
developed to allow for interchangeability and to promote
practices consistent with economies of scale. [Ref. 25 :p.
8] Quality standards have more to do with minimums and
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maximums as they relate to identity, safety, and
performance. Additionally:
Quality standards are more likely to require "enforcement"
than are standards for uniformity. Sellers generally have
a great incentive to cheat, to pass off inferior products
as superior. And buyers usually have more difficulty in
judging quality than some dimensional uniformity needed
for interchangeability. Compared to such simple quality
characteristics as tensile strength or caloric content,
physical dimensions generally are more readily apparent,
easily and acceptably measurable, and dimensional
interchangeability quickly determinable. [Ref. 25 :p. 9]
This supports the premise that despite the generally
accepted principles related to economies of scale, the
voluntary industry adoption and development of non-
government standards does not occur easily. Economic
crisis, the threat of government regulation within an
industry, and the possibility of increasing industry sales
and profit margin are more likely to result in the
institution of standards. For example, in the appliance
industry quality standards were developed without government
intervention but only after consumer choice issues and
product debasement became an important issue on
manufacturers sales and profit figures. [Ref. 26:pp. 52-
53] Similarly, in the computer industry, IBM sabotaged or
resisted every effort by the government and user groups to
establish uniform standards that would either permit easy
comparison with alternative products or assure compatibility
with complementary hardware and software products. [Ref.
26:p. 91]
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It would appear that competition and the desire to
constantly increase the market share of a business are major
forces working concurrently for and against the development
of uniform standards. There is a potentially stratified
market of consumers that can be targeted and catered to
based on such qualities as net income, age, sex, etc. Other
than where true economies of scale exist, it can be argued
that there is little incentive or practicality in any
company standardizing its product.
The development of non-government standards appears to
be linked to an industry's user groups' ability to exercise
a unified front in expressing their wants and desires. Only
in exceptional circumstances can one expect sellers to
arrive at common standards without sufficient input and
direction from the users. As in the appliance industry,
user generated standards or the government's intervention in
imposing standards allows consumers to economically evaluate
consumer goods at the time of purchase. In a manner, this
forces industry to compete fairly for a consumer's dollar.
In other words, it has been stated that industry's feeling
toward voluntary self-regulation is:
...an industry may approve of government regulation when
it limits fringe competition, particularly when the fringe
may be reducing total industry demand. It will not
voluntarily self-regulate when such regulation lowers
profits and it sees its minimum accommodation as identical
to the government's maximum demand. Its understanding of
the government * s maximum requirement may sometimes be
confidently held on the basis of purchaser attitudes. It
may under some circumstances support strong compulsory
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legislation, if such legislation sanctions an exclusive
broadening of the industry's product line. [Ref. 26 :p. 72]
NDI initiatives and the current attempts by the
government to influence the creation of non-government
standards represents an attempt by a large user to make
industry responsible to create public goods. A pure public
good has two critical properties. The first is that it is
not feasible to ration its use. The second is that it is
not desirable to ration its use. [Ref. 27] National
defense is an example of a pure public good which by its
nature can not be equitably billed to those who receive a
benefit from its existence. Therefore, it can be argued
that products and standards that are primarily military in
design and nature are also public goods. As will be
discussed later in the chapter, this effort has been largely
unsuccessful
.
A further economic reason that inhibits the development
of voluntary standards is the technological development rate
within an industry. The short life of technology and the
speed of innovation in many industries today make some
proposed standards obsolete before they are adopted. The
costs of generating the standards are incurred and the
benefits that a standard provides are never realized. A
review of the practices, procedures, and industry/user
involvement in the ASTM F-25 Committee on Shipbuilding
supports these suppositions and facts.
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C. ASTM'S F-2 5 COMMITTEE ON SHIPBUILDING
ASTM has the stated scope of being a corporation that:
...is formed for the development of standards on
characteristics and performance of materials, products,
systems, and services; and the promotion of related
knowledge. In ASTM terminology, standards include test
methods, definitions, practices, classifications, and
specifications. [Ref. 28:p. 1]
F-2 5 is a voluntary industry related committee sponsored
by ASTM. The F-25 Committee is comprised of 263 total
members, 109 of which have voting rights. The committee was
founded in 1978. The members represent industry and the
government/DoD/consumers. The Committee is further broken
down into 10 sub-committees. Each deals with a specific
major equipment area.
The sub-committees are:
Materials (F25.01) Deck Machinery (F25.08)
Coatings (F25.02) Electrical/Automation (F25.10)
Outfitting (F25.03) Machinery (F25.ll)
Hull Structures (F25.04) Piping Systems (F25.13)
Gen'l Requirements Insulation (F25.14)
(F25.07)
The 1987 Annual Book of ASTM Standards . which is
comprised of more than 60 bound volumes, contains 4
standards developed by the F-2 5 committee. Currently, that
number has increased to 71; of these 71, only 14 have been
adopted as acceptable for Navy use. 3 The bulk of the
standards have been produced by the Piping Systems and
Outfitting sub-committees. Navy adoption of an ASTM
3 Handout, ASTM-Committee-F-2 5-Standards . undated, Received
from Mr. Howard Wildman, NAVSEA, March 1988 listing all current
F-2 5 standards and the cognizant NAVSEA engineer.
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standard does not signify that the standard will have carte
blanche approval for any Naval acquisition or application.
Its acceptability must be reviewed by a cognizant engineer
prior to any use in order to preclude a misapplication of
the standard. The cognizant engineer is the NAVSEA engineer
responsible for reviewing, writing, and administrating a
standard or specification.
Many other standards are being worked and reviewed by
NAVSEA engineers for possible future adoption. The
standards development process is long. Even when attempts
are made to expedite the conversion process, the adoption
process can take over nine months.
Grants and contracts from government agencies which are
in accord with OMB Circular A-119, discussed earlier, have
been made to accelerate this procedure. The U.S. Maritime
Administration recently awarded a grant to the F-25
Committee for increased travel funding. The increased
funding is for individuals to attend additional task group
meetings in order to expedite standards development. [Ref.
29: p. 22] These efforts are laudable. Although, it appears
that they will not have a significant impact on expediting
the consensus procedures that are required to occur between
all the users and manufacturers; each trying to protect
there own individual perspectives and biases. Also, the
fact that such contributions are being made is an indictment
of the Committee's ability and industry's resolve to create
51
standards to replace items that have essentially been public
products
.
In accordance with the intent of OMB Circular A-119,
there is considerable effort being put forward to
incorporate more non-government standards in the procurement
process. However, this is not an easy process. Standards
must be written in ASTM format. A proposed standard must
then be approved by the NAVSEA cognizant design engineer's
chain of command prior to being submitted to a sub-committee
task group. The standard generation process to here is
little different than the process involved with creating an
ordinary military standard. The military must still write
the standard or contract for it to be written. Only now,
upon completion of the generation of the proposed standard,
it must pass through an extremely slow ASTM adoption
process. This is one of the reasons why the government has
a natural aversion to the adoption and creation of non-
government standards. To understand this aversion one must
first understand a little about the difficulties encountered
in the ASTM adoption process.
In general the adoption process can be summarized as
follows:
- Originating group submits a proposed standard to the
cognizant sub-committee.
- A ballot with the proposal is mailed to the voting
members. They are directed to respond in a limited
amount of time but not less than 30 days.
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- A two-thirds majority of affirmative votes must be
received prior to any further action being taken.
- Negative voters submit an explanation with their vote
delineating their objections to the proposed standards.
- All negative voters must be notified of receipt of their
vote and the explanation considered by the sub-
committee.
- If the reason for the negative vote is found to be
persuasive then the proposed standard is withdrawn and
returned to the originating group.
- If the reason for the negative vote is not considered
persuasive and the two-thirds approval of the proposal
was achieved then the proposed standard is sent up to
the main committee. A list of all the negative votes
along with the reason and corresponding sub-committee's
comments as to why the negative vote was not found to be
persuasive accompanies the proposal.
Similar procedures are then initiated at both the main
committee and a society level before submission to the
Committee on Standards for final publication determination.
At any step a proposed standard can be sent back to the task
group or sub-committee for revision or clarification. Due
to the fact that the F-25 Committee formally meets only
twice a year, each setback almost certainly results in an
additional six month delay in publishing the standard. It
can be seen how these procedures can easily extend the
formal process over an exceedingly long period of time. The
above actions are required not only for approvals but also
for revisions, reapprovals, and withdrawals. Some standards
proposals have been in the approval process since the
inception of the ASTM F-25 Committee in 1978. [Ref. 30]
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The bottom line is that the approval process is very
cumbersome. Also, after adoption the threat exists that a
standard adopted by the Navy could be significantly changed
or deleted in a sub-committee review or reapproval process.
The assignment of a NAVSEA cognizant engineer is meant to
preclude this circumstance. No one member can control the
actions of the committee. Therefore, in an extreme
circumstance a non-government standard could be superseded
or allowed to lapse and no military specification or Navy
standard drawing would exist to take its place.
In order to alleviate these and other fears ASTM's F25-
94, Administrative Sub-committee on Navy Documents
Conversion created the Handbook to Assist in the Navy
Document Conversion Program . This allows the Navy to
convert current military standards to an ASTM standard,
maintain the NAVSEA cognizant engineer as responsible for
any Navy application or use, but pass the prime
responsibility for content and accuracy of the standard to
ASTM. The program, though relatively new appears destined
to meet with very limited success. There is a supposition
that industry is interested in developing standards
acceptable to the government. That proposition appears to
be false. Government standards written to accommodate those
military requirements that are significantly different than
commercial requirements are equivalent to public goods. A
review of ASTM's performance in the next section indicates
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that industry is unwilling to subsidize the care and
maintenance of converted government standards.
D. ASTM'S PERFORMANCE
As has been stated previously, the F-2 5 Committee's
ability to add new standards at the rate that the government
is considering is highly questionable. Industry's resolve
in seeing such a program through is suspect. There can
hardly be any incentive on their part to provide people to
voluntary standards boards to predominantly review and
update converted military standards. In general, based on
the slow influx of new standards other than those initiated
by the government there is no apparent compelling need on
industry's part to create any new standards at all. The
government, while a large consumer, rarely constitutes
enough of the overall market share to influence industry
participation in the development of standards. There is
also the possibility that if one firm does get involved in
generating a much needed government standard requirement
that the Navy would be prohibited from using it due to the
unfair competitive situation that it may represent.
Therefore, the simple addition of new ASTM standards may not
equate to an industry wide or government acceptance and
adoption. It is extremely naive to assume that acquisition
price savings will be achieved by using a non-government
standard if the standard is applied to a product produced
strictly for government use.
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A massive influx of government standards into the
purview of the F-25 Committee would greatly overload its
volunteer participants. For example, there are 2 members
of the F-2 5 Sub-Committee on Hull Structure. Three are
military, one is the ASTM Staff Manager, and the others are
non-military volunteers. Since this is a voluntary
organization, it is uncertain as to whether or not these
individuals or agencies have either the time, inclination or
resources to expand their subcommittees cognizance over any
new Navy conversion specifications.
In order to determine the extent to which a voluntary
non-government standards group was willing and able to
generate and maintain meaningful government standards,
representative chairman of the sub-committees were contacted
and asked the following questions:
- How long have you been on the committee?
- What percent of your time is spent on committee work?
- How often does your committee meet and what are the
attendance percentages?
- Where do the standardization proposals originate from?
- What is the average processing time from the time a
standard proposal is submitted until it is published?
- What is the backlog of standard proposals for your sub-
committee?
- What is the interest among the industry members of your
sub-committee in developing or converting Navy standards
into ASTM standards and what kind of data does the Navy
make available to a contractor to accomplish this?
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(i.e.: failure, usage, inventory proliferation cost,
range of spare parts support problems)
- How do you assess the performance of your committee?
The results of the interviews were very similar. Sub-
committee Chairmen have been members of ASTM from three to
ten years. The average amount of time that these
individuals spend on ASTM work related matters is from one
to two months a year. All the sub-committees meet twice a
year concurrent with the F-2 5 Main Committee meeting. Task
groups creating certain standards may meet more often and
some sub-committees meet independently as many as four times
per year. Sub-committee member attendance ranged between
30% to 60%. Standard proposals were perceived to originate
evenly between user and industry groups. The average time
required to get a standard accepted and published depends on
the complexity of the item. But all the chairman agreed
that three years appeared to be the norm for a standard that
is not too complex. A nine month acceptance time can be
achieved in unusual situations. With a maximum amount of
personal interest one simple standard was passed in four
months. [Ref. 31]
The most revealing responses were received regarding the
question concerning industry's interest in developing or
converting Navy standards into non-government standards.
The responses indicated there may be some animosity or lack
of confidence in the ability of the commercial and Navy
interests to successfully work together. The frustration
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voiced from the commercial representatives regarding working
with the Navy included:
- They are inflexible in their demands.
- Some of the NAVSEA engineers have been in place for 25
to 3 years. They are comfortable with military
standards and military specifications and are resistant
to any change.
- There is no one person or committee in charge of
conversion to ASTM.
- At each semi-annual meeting the Navy sends a different
representative. There is no continuity. Therefore,
when an item comes up for vote the Navy representative
often casts a negative vote throwing the standard back
to the task group and adding at least another six months
to the acceptance process and the convening of the next
sub-committee meeting. This is an even more exasperat-
ing problem in that the protest is often over an item
that was resolved with their predecessor representative
many months prior.
- NAVSEA representatives often do not have the final say.
When determinations or conflicts have to be resolved, we
first have to cut our way through a bureaucracy of
civilian engineers only to then be confronted by the
military hierarchy before a matter can be resolved.
- Non-government standards are viewed as a threat to their
livelihood.
It is not surprising that the viewpoint regarding the
Navy's perception of the same initiatives was nearly
opposite. NAVSEA representatives to the voluntary industry
standards bodies cite such distractions as:
- Certain company's are trying to add items to a standard
that would result in them achieving an unnecessary
advantage in a contract bid for the item.
- Companies are unwilling to recognize the unique
requirements that are inherent to a Naval shipboard
environment.
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- Supervisors, though publicly voicing support for a shift
toward non-government standards, are often against
writing standards in ASTM format.
Throughout all the interviews the undercurrent of
feeling was that non-government standards could work but
that there must be more cooperation. The prevailing feeling
appeared to be that the push to develop shipbuilding
standards started many years too late. The Navy's need to
develop Military Standards and Specifications was primarily
caused by a lack of any alternative standards to use or any
standards bodies that were staffed with members sensitive to
Navy or ruggedized standards necessary in a military
environment.
E. IMPLICATIONS
Many standards bodies and organizations exist whose
standards could be effectively applied to some of the Navy's
procurement needs. In many cases these standards could be
used to identify items that are acceptable HM&E NDI
materials. There is work being done in trying to develop
new standards through voluntary organizations other than
ASTM. However, there is little interaction between industry
and Navy to identify further potential candidates for Navy
acceptance. This situation is not likely to change. The
Navy in most instances is too nominal a buyer to warrant
industry embracing a unified standards programs. One of the
industry representatives interviewed revealed that his
company only partially relied on the ASTM standards in its
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own procurement process. Procurements within his company
were modified by individualized standards in much the same
fashion as the Navy.
It is therefore not surprising that industry seldom
approaches the Navy volunteering to develop a standard for a
unique usage requirement. Yet when they do, the Navy
appears to rarely supply them with more than specification
data and review assistance. Other information that would
provide a company with incentive and reasons why a new
design or standard would be beneficial to both the Navy and
the company such as Annual Buy Figures are not provided to
the company. When the Navy decides that a new standard or
specification is required, they do not go before the
cognizant committees and sub-committees with the applicable
data such as maintenance downtime, equipment mission
requirements, and other historically developed data such as
exact form, fit, and function requirements that could
persuade industry members to invest their time in the
creation of the pertinent standard.
A recent example cited during the interview process of
the research for this paper was a fleet generated
requirement for a "jaws of life" lifesaving device. In this
case the Navy refused to accept the standard for these items
that was already being used profusely in the non-military
sector. Instead the cognizant powers at NAVSEA decided to
design a gold-plated government standard that would result
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in an instrument that would do more than its civilian
counterpart. The result is that the device has not yet been
officially procured. The standard is not completed and no
acquisition cost estimate exists. However, fleet units have
probably already utilized their own purchasing authority to
obtain commercial versions of the lifesaving item.
F. CONCLUSIONS
The non-government sector is an ideal place to encourage
the implementation of standards. The lengthy procedures
that non-government standards boards require to accept and
adopt a standard make it unlikely that a large number of
government standards can be converted in any reasonable
period of time. These groups are voluntary and would not be
able to physically implement and review the volume of
standards and specifications that is involved with a massive
Navy conversion effort. Additionally, the demonstrated
turnover rate of membership representatives since the
Committee's inception in 1978 of 80% to 95% will result in a
lot of wasted effort and startover requirements.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense's directive mandating
usage of commercial specifications in 325 federal classes of
material appears to be unrealistic. Many commercial
specifications are not suitable for military purposes. A
massive production of paper work in preparing justifications
to deviate from this directive is the obvious fallout of
such a policy. However, the Secretary did recognize that
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drastic action appears to be necessary to cause the services
to seriously evaluate options to generating new standards
when an equipment need is identified.
ASTM is one of the few voluntary standards
organizations, with which NAVSEA has developed such a wide
degree of representation. It is unrealistic to believe that
NAVSEA has the manpower to fairly represent and voice the
Navy's concerns before all the non-government standards
bodies that exist. Yet the adoption of non-government
standards is clearly a form of NDI behavior that has the
potential of generating savings if properly administrated.
A more controlled conversion from government to non-
government standards would seem to be warranted. By taking
the best aspects of the Navy standardization programs,
NAVSEA could identify candidates for conversion from
government to non-government standards. Candidates could be
identified using equipment uses and traits that indicate
savings could be achieved if a non-government standard
existed. The list could be prioritized based on the
similarity between the military and commercial requirements
and estimated savings projected from available historical
ownership and acquisition cost data. This process that
would closely resemble the Standardization Candidate
Selection Criteria currently being employed at NAVSEALOGCEN
would allow NAVSEA engineers to concentrate their conversion
efforts on equipments where significant dollar benefits
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could be achieved. It could be the work of future research
or theses to develop a formula that could identify the
traits and information that could be applied to classes and
types of equipment to forecast dollar savings that could be





In Chapter I, two goals were proposed for this thesis.
They were to investigate: 1) The effect of NDI legislation
on the efforts to curb APL proliferation in the purchases of
HM&E related items, and 2) Whether or not voluntary non-
government standards and boards are an effective force by
which to incorporate the Navy's specific needs and
requirements into standards. In order to answer these
concerns eight subsidiary questions were addressed in the
previous four chapters. Each chapter summarized its
findings and made conclusions relevant to the area
discussed. This section is a brief review of these findings
with an emphasis on the overall implications of the previous
conclusions on the above two goals.
B. REVIEW
The following findings have been supported in previous
chapters and are listed below for qualification and review:
1. NDI legislation will have little impact on the
proliferation problem unless it is interpreted in a
way that precludes the further development and
implementation of NAVSEALOGCEN standardization
programs such as the Standardization Candidate




Current HM&E purchases appear to be predominantly NDI
in nature with ruggedization often taking place where
necessary.
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3. Firms' product differentiation, avoidance of industry
standards, and reliance upon company standards have
resulted in indeterminably large amounts of additional
HM&E ownership ship costs.
4. Proposed DoD regulations regarding restrictions on the
development of new Navy specifications are unrealistic
due to the interests represented by the non-government
standards bodies, the size of the bodies, and the
inability of the Navy to fairly represent itself on
all these bodies with the limited number of personnel
available.
5. Non-government standards are not always adopted when
feasible and the reasons appear to be highly
subjective in at least some instances.
6. The procedures involved in developing a non-government
standard of any significance are long and uncertain.
A single objecting member with a valid objection can
prohibit a standard from ever being forwarded for
Society acceptance.
7. NAVSEA representatives are familiar with government
standards which may be a contributing factor toward
the perceived reluctance to implement industry
standards. Increased control of the end product is
often deemed essential despite the initial cost
increase.
The Navy is just now beginning to realize the magnitude
of its standardization problem. Ownership costs are being
calculated. While these calculations are loosely computed
figures based on subjective assignments of values, they
represent unquestionably large capital outlays. The savings
projected in such programs as the SCSC and RFP appear
insignificant when compared to the total SPCC outlays in
1984 of $1.75 billion. Yet, the savings are significant
enough to provide the annual monetary requirements for a
small battle group.
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The availability of many equipment models that can
perform to certain standards has contributed to the
proliferation problem. Acceptance of non-government
standards and an increased reliance on NDI may reduce the
acquisition price but not without dramatically increasing
equipment life-cycle costs.
Unfortunately, the Navy has not sufficiently identified
the sources of the proliferation problem. They have
developed programs at different levels of the procurement
system that will slow the problem but not stem it. In order
to be able to make realistic projections of savings that can
be realized by implementing a standardization program, one
must be reasonably confident that solution will stop further
proliferation.
The major problems that have developed from NDI
purchases as discussed in this paper are from those
purchases initiated below or above the SPCC level. Program
managers must make tradeoff decisions when bringing a
product on line and often deployment takes precedence over
ILS considerations. These decisions are made knowing that
part support problems will develop in the future. Purchases
are made by type commanders with little consideration given
to ownership costs as they are unaware or perhaps uncaring
of the future problems that may result in providing support
and replacement for such systems. The contribution to
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proliferation from overhaul and maintenance activities is
also not clearly understood.
Corrective action cannot be taken without carefully
evaluating the impact that a resulting policy decision could
have on continued proliferation and increased life-cycle
costs. Congress' law ordering a preference for NDI material
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense's directive to use
non-government standards in 325 Federal Classes of materials
may be the types of shotgun kneejerk reactions that increase
total acquisition costs rather than decreasing them. It is
clear that the Navy has not adopted non-government standards
wherever possible. Yet, in general, it appears that non-
government standards are not easily made to incorporate
applications that could be defined as solely military.
Their use must be carefully monitored with eyes toward the
many problems that can result in terms of quality,
reliability, maintainability, and supportability. These
considerations are inter-related and become more pronounced
in a shipboard environment where contract support is not
always available.
C. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Costs and benefits are not easily definable or
assignable in any of the problems investigated in this
report. It is important that people understand and evaluate
the effects of a decision to purchase an NDI item or adopt a
commercial standard. The effects that NDI decisions have on
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projected ownership costs and equipment and parts
proliferation can be projected and assessed.
Historical data justifies restricting or precluding the
introduction to the fleet of new equipment that is
configured differently but performs similar functions as
existing equipment. The evidence suggests that the
additional ownership costs incurred by such procedures are
prohibitive. Yet, procurement practices to date have
allowed this proliferation to continue. Innovative
procurement methods must be developed and utilized in areas
where it has been identified that increased use of NDI and
inadequate government standards equates to high life-cycle
costs. The two inch valve program and other successful
examples exist to prove that substantial savings can be
generated by having the Navy create its own rigid design and
performance specifications and standards.
It remains to be seen whether or not the Navy/military
standards can be converted to non-government standards that
will generate additional savings. One conclusion that is
quite apparent from the limited interviews conducted
regarding government use of and conversion to non-government
standards is that it appears to be infeasible on any grand
scale. Voluntary standards groups are too underfunded,
understaffed, and uninterested in developing standards for
items predominantly considered to be for use strictly by the
military. That does not mean to imply that the Navy should
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not use non-government standards where they are available
and suitable for the projected use of the equipment being
procured. In fact, the overriding premise of this thesis
has been that no one rule can apply to all purchases.
A general lack of communications appears to exist
between all the different agencies involved with NDI policy,
specification control, and proliferation control/
standardization. Attempts to control proliferation are
directly opposed to plans to incorporate greater NDI
purchases and a higher volume of non-government standards
.
Non-government standards and NDI can offer time and
dollar savings and conveniences over other product
development and procurement practices. But a coordinated
attack should be formulated utilizing the standardization
tools in consonance with the available industry goods and
standards. Determinations could be made to adopt non-
government standards that met criteria that assured their
long term suitability to the service's needs. The
government could then give priority to developing non-
government standards, with industry assisting, for items
that:
- historical data has proven that standardization is
becoming essential.
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